Events Leading to my Detention

1. In 2013, I commenced a commercial undertaking. The Campaign against me, which started that same year, made it impossible for me to conduct affairs related to that project: I was unable even to open a corporate bank account.
2. In August, 2014, unable to pay my rent, I became homeless. I slept rough for several months. During that time, the campaign against me continued unabated.
3. In November, facing possible death from exposure and aware I could not improve my situation while the Campaign continued, I reported the Campaign to the police. They offered me insults.
(i). I tried to report the matter to the police twice more. On the last occasion, I told them that, given the existential threat occasioned by the Campaign, should they not act, I should be obliged to resort to apply physical force against my persecutors. They did nothing.
4. In the evenings, I would visit the Interchange: it was warm and I could read by the light. The surveillance against me was incessant, obvious and provocative: plainly, they were baiting me to provide them a pretext to section me and damage my credibility.
(i). When I slept rough, I slept in woodland. Given the Campaign against me, my uncertainty as to its intentions and the physical degradation concomitant to the conditions in which I was living, I thought it prudent to arm myself with a sort of improvised baton - a shortened rolling pin.
5. At the start of November, 2014, a man was deposited at the Interchange by a car I had noticed on several occasions in previous days, appearing to be involved in the surveillance against me. I identified it by its registration plate.
(i). He behaved provocatively: smiling mockingly, etc. He left the Interchange, I followed him: he circled the block. I was going to confront him but I decided against it. I told him:
"You're lucky; I have decided to give you the benefit of a doubt."
He laughed mockingly and appeared unconcerned.
(ii). Perhaps half an hour later, I engaged him in banal conversation: I thought he was involved in the Campaign but I wished to make certain. He was relaxed.
(iii). He said he was a care worker and had been visiting his sister. He bemoaned the cost of travelling; he was travelling the first part of his journey by coach but he would make the second part by train. The train journey was a good deal more expensive.
(a). I asked him why he did not complete the entire journey by coach; he said the coach did not stop in the town to which heas travelling.
(b). I was familiar with his destination. I told him, if he took a coach and got off at the next town, he could take a bus from there to his destination.
(c). He appeared grateful. I asked him:
"But you would still have some money left over from this thing, even if you have to take the train?"
Unthinkingly, he replied:
"Yes. It pays very well."
whereupon he caught himself and a horrified expression passed over his face as he realised what he had just said.
6. Later, in his statement to the police, he seemed to try to make me appear deranged: he said my speech was "random" and that, from the outset, I caused him continually to fear for his safety, especially when I followed him from the Interchange and then told him he was lucky I was giving him the benefit of a doubt.
(i). People who saw me during the time slept rough, including on that day, described me as normal and polite, and said I was not unkempt or intimidating.
(ii). When I cross-examined him in court, in 2018:
(a). He mentioned there was a police van at the Interchange, when I followed him around the block. I asked why he had not approached the police, since he was afraid. He said he considered doing so but I told him I was giving him the benefit of a doubt: that set his mind at ease. Yet, in his police statement, he declared that statement alarmed him.
(b). I asked him if he expected the Court to believe that a stranger who followed him around the block, causing him fear, cryptically told him he was giving him the benefit of a doubt and then spoke nonsense to him for more than a quarter of an hour, put him at ease rather than alarmed him. He claimed my conversation had been perfectly lucid and normal - a contradiction of his statement to the police.
(c). I asked what this other job that paid better than his normal job was. He insisted hebhad only ever had one job, since leaving university - as a care-worker.
7. When I struck him, I was certain he was part of the Campaign. His statement to the police confirmed me in that view. After I cross-examined him, in Court, I was entirely persuaded of his participation in the Campaign against me.
8. The fact I struck that man, in those circumstances, may not be said to prove I am dangerous, it certainly does not mean I am too dangerous to at liberty and completely without restrictions - apart, of course, from the normal restrictions that apply to everyone in a civilised country.
9. In court, I cited self defence and the prevention of crime as my defence. It permits a person who sincerely believes a crime is in progress may use physical force to try and stop that crime. The reasonableness or unreasonableness of his belief may not be grounds for conviction.
10. Before the Jury retired to deliberate, the Judge instructed it to return a verdict of guilty, if it thought my belief might have been delusional. The Judge thereby essentially deprived me of the opportunity to defend myself against the charges:
(i). Given the provisions of the Act, during the Process, I considered treatment of the question of reasonableness of my opinion to be superfluous. But the court did impede my attempts to treat it even as lightly as I deemed necessary.
(ii). The Judge's instruction to the Jury, when the strategy for defence was beyond adaptation and after all arguments had been made, finally, necessarily left me bereft of a defence at the last. I was ambushed by the Court.